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Probability Logic Fails in Immitigable
Uncertainty, but Strategic Logic Does Not
We are grateful to Professor Arend (2020) for his
engagement with our work on uncertainty and the
choice of strategic logics (Packard & Clark, in press).
We easily acknowledge that there are reasons to
disagree with our conclusions as they imply a min-
imization, if not outright rejection, of much of mod-
ern behavioral research. It was not surprising, then,
to receive Professor Arend’s (2020) criticisms,which
appear to be based in what we might call the “epi-
stemic camp” (contra our own “aleatory camp”) of
behavioral research.1 The epistemic camp holds all
uncertainty to be what we, in our article, describe as
“epistemicuncertainty”andhaselsewherebeencalled
“ambiguity” (Packard, Clark, & Klein, 2017)—that is,
there is always a probability distribution that can be
applied to a decision, even if it is unknown and/or
subjectively generated in the mind of the decision-
maker. This assumption is quite seductive, as it allows
probabilistic models to be applied to literally any
choice situation and lends the appearance of scientific
rigor. Professor Arend elaborated this position to con-
clude that any uncertainty that falls outside of it is es-
sentially chaotic and cannot be managed by anything
beyond luck.
Our contrary position in the aleatory camp is that
this epistemic uncertainty or ambiguity should not be
confused with aleatory uncertainty—they are different
in nature. Thus, there is no valid way to “convert” ale-
atory uncertainty into ambiguity by imposing a proba-
bility distribution onto something that cannot have
one. Most business uncertainty involves such aleatory
uncertainty due, in Knight’s (1921: 311) words, to “the
inherent, absolute unpredictability of things, out of the
sheerbrute fact that the resultsofhumanactivitycannot
be anticipated and then only in so far as even a proba-
bility calculation in regard to them is impossible and
meaningless.”Thus,while theprobabilisticapproachto
decision-making preferred by the epistemic camphas a
place, we, likemostmanagers (Harrison, 1977), reject it
as unrealistic for the majority of real-world choice
scenarios. In the language of set theory, we hold
the typical set of options available to an actor to be
“open” or, more precisely, “infinite” (Packard et al.,
2017), and not “closed,” as is required by probability
theory. This renders the probability-based logic em-
ployed in the epistemic camp’s behavioral research,




Epistemic theorists sometimes accuse aleatory the-
orists of erroneously theorizing predictive behavior in
uncertainty, where prediction is supposedly impossi-
ble. True (ontological) prediction could of course be
impossible, but this is quite different from epistemic
prediction—or imaginatively forming a mental ex-
pectation. Thus, their criticism is based in under-
standing unpredictability as “epistemic,”meaning the
mind cannot form a prediction whatsoever. But alea-
tory theorists, in fact, reference an ontological “un-
knowability” or “unpredictability,”wherein a (future)
state of affairs is strictly unforeseeable. As Lachmann
1 We are unclear whether Professor Arend would place
himself fully into this camp, as he concedes the existence
of immitigable uncertainty, but supposes it cannot be
managed whatsoever. Whether he recognizes aleatory
uncertainty or not, then, the implications are (for him) the
same—only epistemic uncertainty matters in practice.
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(1977: 19) put it, “the future is unknowable but not
unimaginable.” That is, one cannot truly know the
undetermined reality that is yet to come—but we are
not claiming that such futures cannot be imagined. As
stated in our article, “attempts to predict aleatorically
[immitigably] uncertain outcomes are possible . . . The
humanmind is capable of imagining possibilities and,
from them, forming expectations, even for and within
indeterminate circumstances” (Packard & Clark, in
press: 26).
Let us justify our contention that “unknowability”
and “unpredictability” are ontological claims, as they
might appear to be epistemological claims. What do
we mean when we describe a future state of affairs as
“unpredictable”? A simple answer to this might be
that the causal knowledge needed to predict such an
outcome is unattainable, but let us dig a bit deeper.
Why is thatknowledgeunattainable? Inall suchcases,
the states of affairs and causal mechanisms necessary
to sufficient causal knowledge are both unobservable
and non-deducible a priori. In many such cases, as in
the case of free will, its unobservability is due to the
fact that such conditions are yet to be fully deter-
mined. Thus, what is meant by “unknowability” or
“unpredictability” is anontological stateof affairs that
is epistemically inaccessible—there is not now any
observationalmechanism (whether ornot youbelieve
we might someday devise one) whereby that onto-
logical state of affairs, including causal mechanics,
can be rationally or empirically discovered.
Epistemic unpredictability is a largely useless
concept, a rare result of ontological unpredictability
and extreme anxietywhere an individual is unable to
make predictions. In games such as roulette, the
player can and, in fact, must make an outcome pre-
diction when placing a bet. Such an outcome is not
unpredictable in an epistemological sense, but it is
unpredictable in the ontological sense—the player
cannot know what the specific outcome will be
without cheating.
When considering the uncertain contexts of busi-
nessdecisions,whichdependonhumandecisionsand
actions, this distinction becomes even more meaning-
ful. Supposeanentrepreneurhasa commitment froma
buyer. On this basis, the entrepreneur has a rea-
sonable epistemic prediction of a sale. However,
this epistemic predictability does not extend to on-
tological predictability—future human behavior is
not utterly knowable because of the problem of free
will, as we put forth in our article. The entrepreneur
does not know the buyer will follow through be-
cause the buyer can change their mind. Human ac-
tion is, ontologically, undetermined until the action
is actually taken. Contracts and assurances may
reduce such propensities, but perfect predictability
is always impossible due to reasons we outline in
our article.
PROBABILITY LOGIC FAILS IN UNCERTAINTY
A second and perhaps more important challenge
to the epistemic camp concerns its insistent usage of
probability logic in its theorizing of uncertainty—a
context decidedly unfit for such logic. The epistemic
camp has developed extensive theory on the tenuous
presumption that we act as if every decision were
based in probabilities (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010). It is
on this basis that Professor Arend (2020: 702) sup-
poses that, in aleatory uncertainty, “any approach
must be as (in)effective as any other when it comes to
predicting or controlling the outcomeof the event.” In
other words, all uncertain outcome probabilities are
equal, there arenogreater or lesser likelihoods, and so
there are no better or worse choices—only luck. This
conclusion is a misapplication of probability logic to
an open-set (non-probabilistic) context. Ontological
unpredictability or unknowability does not imply
that “any outcome can occur,” as Professor Arend
(2020: 702) claims, nor does it imply an utter random-
ness of outcomes, a presumption that the epistemic
camp simplistically draws from probability theory.
The epistemic camp makes two erroneous infer-
ences with such claims—(1) that an infinite set in-
cludes literally everything and (2) that all elements of
an infinite set are equally likely—both of which are
easily discredited. First, infinite sets do not contain
everything—an infinite choice set doesnotmean that
“any outcome can occur.” The set of whole numbers
is infinite, yet excludes all non-whole numbers—a
much larger infinite set (note that infinite sets can be
larger and smaller). A jailed convict, standing in the
middle of their cell, would have literally infinite
possible directions anddistances inwhich they could
move—a circlehas infinitepoints, asdoesa geometric
area. However, this does not mean that the convict
could go literally anywhere. An infinite set of options
is constrained by the limits of possibility—a convict,
in fact, has avery small set of infiniteoptions available
to them. That an entrepreneur may have limited re-
sourcesneednot logically imply that thepossibleuses
for those resources are finite, nor does itmean that the
infinity of possibilities available to the entrepreneur
are unconstrained. Thus, aleatory uncertainty does
notmean “that any outcome can occur.”
Second, we can similarly reject claims that, un-
der conditions of aleatory uncertainty, “no actions
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taken by the decision-maker can affect the range
or the probability of what can occur at the event”
(Arend, 2020: 702) such that all possible outcomes
are equally likely and can only be capitalized on
by luck. This inference is based in the faulty pre-
sumption that all undefined probabilities are def-
initionally equal and, thus, cannot be altered.
That is, if we do not know the precise probability of
an outcome—if a defined probability does not
exist—then the true probability is (or must be as-
sumed to be) equal for each unknown outcome.
Again, this conclusion is contrived from the epi-
stemic camp’s closed-set probability theoretic
tradition, which we reject for the open-set hu-
man experience. Such a simplification imposes a
uniform probability distribution for uncertain
outcomes, an assumption we decidedly reject—
probabilities not only are not known in uncer-
tainty (in which case, it would still be unsatisfac-
tory to cast such unknown probabilities as
logically uniform), but do not exist. Except in ex-
tremely limited circumstances of pure Knightian
risk, human expectation and judgment are not
properly characterized by probabilities at all,
but by possibilities. Possibilities reflect what can
occur, and are characterized on a spectrum of de-
grees ranging from impossibility to perfect pos-
sibility (Shackle, 1949, 1969). Even in radical
uncertainty (wherein the set of outcomes is infin-
ite), some outcomes are more “possible” than
others, and yet other outcomes are literally
impossible.
Professor Arend infers from this logic that we
suppose that human action cannot alter the possi-
bility of an uncertain outcome. In fact, we act pre-
cisely because we believe that we can alter the
possibility of an outcome—if possibilities could
not be altered, wewould have no reason to act at all
(vonMises, 1998). The epistemic camp’s reduction
of aleatory uncertainty to “anything could hap-
pen” ignores all that we know about causality and
our ability to manipulate it. The point we make in
our article is not that we cannot or should not
predict outcomes or seek to bring them about; it is
merely that any outcomes dependent on the vol-
untary action of others cannot ever be perfectly
known a priori (i.e., ontological unpredictability),
which lends to especial difficulties for social the-
orists, such as economic actors (Felin & Zenger,
2017).
Because it is clear that some possibilities are more
likely than others, the epistemic camp has for a
century attempted to apply the framework of
statistical probabilities to such outcomes, thereby
reducing all behavior to problems of “risk.”2 But
doing so is andhas always been amistake. If behavior
can be creative, if the options available to the actor
are infinite (butnot unconstrained), then there canbe
no set-theoretic completeness from which probabil-
ities can be derived. Probability theory has little
bearing on human behavior, except in the most lim-
ited (“risky”) contexts. We, like Shackle (1949,
1969), advocate a turn away from probability lan-
guage and theory in behavioral science, and favor
instead a science of comparative “possibility.”
THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESCRIBING
‘BETTER’ STRATEGIES
Let us conclude by rebutting Professor Arend’s
(2020: 702) specific quarrel against us, that“theoretical
prescriptions for better dealing with immitigable un-
certainty should not be attempted, as logic appears to
indicate it is not possible.” The premise of his argu-
ment is that we attempt to “optimize” entrepreneurial
behavior, as if our recommendations for pursuing a
non-predictive decision logic in contexts of compara-
tively greater immitigable uncertainty entailed some
kind of definitive statement of what is to come. Our
goal is, of course, not “optimization”—we agree with
Professor Arend that “optimization” is impossible,
which we believe is clear from our article.
Professor Arend’s objection that “theoretical pre-
scriptions for better dealing with immitigable uncer-
tainty should not be attempted” runs counter to the
entire fields of strategic management and strategic
entrepreneurship—prescriptive (design) sciences in-
tent on offering theory-based tools for better navigating
unpredictabilities. In fact, such tools and strategies are
useful precisely because of the context of ontological
unpredictability. It is true that a business manager
cannot “optimize” their strategic actions because they
cannot perfectly predict the outcomes of their actions,
nor the actions of their competitors, consumers, or
2 Friedman (2007: 282) exemplified this view: “In his
seminal work, Frank Knight drew a sharp distinction be-
tween risk, as referring to events subject to a known or
knowable probability distribution and uncertainty, as re-
ferring to events for which it was not possible to specify
numerical probabilities. I have not referred to this dis-
tinction because I do not believe it is valid. I follow L. J.
Savage in his view of personal probability, which denies
any valid distinction along these lines. We may treat peo-
ple as if they assigned numerical probabilities to every
conceivable event.”
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othermarket actors (Milliken, 1987). But it is precisely
this ontological unpredictability that strategic tools—
such as those provided by the resource-based view, for
instance—are designed to manage, and only within
ontological unpredictability do such strategies become
meaningful at all; otherwise, optimization calculus
would clearly be preferred. By mustering particularly
valuable resources and capabilities, by contingency
planning, through more organic organizing, or by de-
veloping andmaintaining dynamic capabilities, a firm
puts itself in a stronger position to respond to and
survive unpredicted events. This is not “optimiza-
tion,” of course. Some unpredicted event could still
cause the firm to fail, in spite of employing best-known
strategies, while another firm with a “bad” strategy
might get lucky. Certainly, better epistemic prediction
would allow better strategic organization, but, in onto-
logical unpredictability, such predictions are innately
unreliable.Agoodstrategy, then, is one intended todeal
with the aleatory uncertainty also, and not just the epi-
stemic uncertainty, by providing the firm with tools
for navigating ontological unpredictability.
But theconclusionwedraw inour article, that firms
and entrepreneurs should normatively prefer non-
predictive decision-making logics when confronted
with immitigable aleatory uncertainty, and a predic-
tive or uncertainty-mitigation strategy where the un-
certainty is predominantly epistemic—our “advising
firms to be flexible in the face of immitigable uncer-
tainty,” asProfessorArend (2020: 702) put it—wasnot
our intended contribution. Such strategies, of course,
have been well accepted for years, both in strategic
management (e.g., Mintzberg, 1973) and in entrepre-
neurship (e.g., Sarasvathy, 2001) contexts. Instead, our
intended contributions are twofold. Our first aim was
and is to advance the case for a scientific turn from the
epistemic camp to the aleatory camp. And our second
goal was precisely in laying out the case for why the
argument—that “theoretical prescriptions for better
dealing with immitigable uncertainty should not be
attempted, as logic appears to indicate it is not possi-
ble” (Arend, 2020: 702)—is wrong. Such prescrip-
tions, such as those put forth in effectuation theory,
are verypossible once youhave themeta-theory right.
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